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children as part of their general obligation to support but it is
strongly implied."
Current income seems to have become the accepted criterion
for determining the ability to pay alimony. In some instances,
current income has been adequate to meet a substantial award
without looking to luxury assets; in those instances, the courts
have granted awards consistent with the standard of living of
the parties. 12 In many cases where the obligor has had moderate
income and no luxury assets, the payment of the award may have
served to reduce drastically his standard of living. The instant
case indicates that even where the amount requested has been
to cover expenses necessary to life and health, such as food,
lodging, and medical care, the courts do not seem inclined to set
the award so high as to force the parent to liquidate even luxury
assets. This is justified where the amount requested is higher
than current income of an obligor living on a bare subsistence
level. It is perhaps less justified where the award is more than
the current income of an obligor owning valuable luxury assets.
It is submitted that where the award is to cover those basic
necessities, e.g., food, lodging, and medical care, the court might
consider the existence of luxury assets in determining ability
to pay.
Leila Obier Cutshaw
FEDERAL JURISDICTION - WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION SUITS
FILED ORIGINALLY IN FEDERAL COURTS-
AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY
Defendant filed a workmen's compensation claim with the
Texas Industrial Accident Board against his employer's insurer,
11. Other jurisdictions have so held. Matthews v. State, 126 So.2d 245 (Miss.
App. 1961) ; Osborn v. Weatherford, 27 Ala. App. 258, 170 So. 95 (1936). See
54 C.J.S. Maintenance 904 (1948). French commentators were of the opinion
that the alimony obligation included expenses occasioned by sickness. See 1
PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA
STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 681 (1959). See also 2 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET
HOUQUES-FOURCADE, TRAITII THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL no 2077
(2d ed. 1900) ; 9 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FaANCAIS n0 553 (6th ed. 1953).
In defining the obligation to support, La8 Siete Partidas provided for "all other
,things necessary for them, and without which men can not live" but does not
mention care of the insane specifically. Tit. XIX, Law 2. Spanish writers also
include medical care in the obligation to support, again according to ability to
pay. 4 VALVERDE Y VALVERDE, DERECHO CIVIL ESPAiROL 537 (1926).
12. Williams v. Barnette, 226 La. 635, 76 So.2d 912 (1954) ; Wilmot v. Wl-
mot, 223 La. 221, 65 So.2d 321 (1953) ; Wilson v. Wilson, 129 So.2d 61 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1961).
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alleging total and permanent incapacity and claiming the maxi-
mum statutory recovery of $14,035. After administrative hear-
ings the Board made an award of $1,050. Pursuant to the Texas
statute, which provided a trial de novo to the parties if either
wished to contest the board award,' plaintiff insurer immedi-
ately filed this diversity action in federal court. Plaintiff denied
defendant's right to any recovery under Texas law, but alleged
defendant's $14,035 claim to be the matter in controversy. De-
fendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the amount in con-
troversy was only $1,050, the amount of the award, and thus
insufficient to meet the federal jurisdictional requirement that
the amount in controversy exceed "the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs."'2 Alternatively, defendant filed
a counter-claim for $14,035.3 The federal district court dis-
missed plaintiff's complaint. 4 The court of appeals reversed, 5
finding the requisite amount present.6 On certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed. In a federal court
action by an insurer to set aside a workmen's compensation
award by a state administrative board, where the state statute
allows complete de novo litigation of the workman's right to
recover any claims arising out of his injury, the jurisdictional
amount is that claimed in good faith by the plaintiff in his com-
1. TEXAS ANN. Civ. STAT. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon, 1956).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1958). Subsequent to the filing of the insurer's
action in federal court, but before making his motion to dismiss that action, the
worker filed a similar suit in state court in which he claimed $14,035.
3. The counterclaim was designated by defendant as compulsory. With excep-
tions not applicable here, FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) requires a party to file a
counterclaim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject of the
opposing party's claim.
4. The district court's decision is not reported, but it is said by the court of
appeals to have been based entirely upon National Sur. Corp. v. Chamberlain, 171
F. Supp. 591 (N.D. Tex. 1959). See 275 F.2d 148, 150 (5th Cir. 1960). In
Chamberlain, where the facts were parallel to those in the instant case except that
the worker in that case had filed his state court action prior to the insurer's
federal action, the district judge dismissed the plaintiff's complaint on the basis
that the Board award should determine jurisdiction and that it was inadequate in
that case to place a sufficient amount in controversy to satisfy the federal jurisdic-
tional requirements. It was also said that the federal courts "should decline the
exercise of jurisdiction even if the jurisdictional amount were involved in cases
where an appeal is filed in the State court within the time provided by State
law" in order to give effect to the 1958 prohibition of removal of state workmen's
compensation actions to federal courts. 171 F. Supp. 591, 598 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
Chamberlain appears to have been the first Texas federal court case to consider
in depth the effect of the 1958 amendment (see note 9 infra and accompanying
text) on Texas workmen's compensation actions filed originally in federal court.
5. 275 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1960).
6. It was held by the court of appeals that the 1958 statute prohibiting removal
did not apply to an original action filed by the insurer, and that federal court
jurisdiction over Texas workmen's compensation cases was "special" so that the
federal courts were bound -by the state rule which held the amount in controversy
in such cases to be the amount of the claim before the Board. Ibid.
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plaint, notwithstanding that the board award may have been
for less than the required jurisdictional minimum. In addition,
although removal of workmen's compensation actions from state
court is prohibited by federal statute, there is federal jurisdic-
tion of an insurer's action filed originally in federal court. Hor-
ton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348 (1961).
In 1958 Congress took steps to relieve the growing congestion
in federal courts by reducing the number of cases over which
the federal courts had jurisdiction. 7 As part of that plan, Con-
gress raised the minimum jurisdictional amount from $3,000 to
$10,000, 8 and prohibited the removal of state workmen's com-
pensation cases from state to federal courts.9 The latter provi-
sion, although primarily aimed at reducing crowded dockets, 10
was also justified in the Senate Report as a method of removing
a coercive procedural weapon from the insurer's use by giving
the workman the choice of federal or state forum."
The Texas workmen's compensation statute1 2 allows either
7. Both the House and Senate Reports on the legislation use the following
language: "In the years following World War II the judicial business of the
United States district courts increased tremendously. Total civil cases filed are
up 75 percent. . . . Most of the increase has occurred in the diversity of citizen-
ship cases. . . . In adopting this legislation, the committee feels . . . that it will
ease the workload of our federal courts." S. Rep. No. 1830,, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
2-3 (1958) ; H.R. Rep. No. 1706, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1958). One of the
principal features of the legislation, aimed particularly at reducing diversity juris-
diction, is the provision that a corporation should be considered for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction as a citizen of the state of incorporation as well as a citizen
of the state in which the corporation's principal place of business is located. See
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1958).
8. 72 Stat. 415 (1958), amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1952).
9. 72 Stat. 415 (1958), amending 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (1952). In its amended
form 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) (1958) reads: "A civil action in any State court
arising under the workmen's compensation laws of such State may not be removed
to any district court of the United States."
10. S. Rep. No. 1768, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958) ; S. Rep. No. 1830, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6-9 (1958) ; 104 Cong. Rec. 12683 (1958) (remarks of Representa-
tive Smith after he had suggested the amendment prohibiting removal) : "Those
cases have resulted, in those particular states . . . in a great deal of congestion in
the Federal courts. . . . I had a letter the other day from [a federal district judge
in Texas who said] . . . it hampered his work, the time taken up with these com-
pensation cases, in view of the peculiar state law in the State of Texas." THE
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES 15 (1957), in reporting its approval of an early version of
the provision, stated that "the United States district courts in Texas, Alabama,
and New Mexico receive a substantial number of such cases by removal and the
district courts of Louisiana receive some such cases."
11. S. Rep. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1958) : "Very often cases
removed to the Federal courts require the workman to travel long distances and to
bring his witnesses at great expense. This places an undue burden upon the work-
man and very often the workman settles his claim because he cannot afford the
luxury of a trial in Federal court. . . . [T]he workman [under this legislation]
has the option to file his case in either the Federal or State court. If he files in
the State court it is not removable to the Federal court."
12. TEXAS ANN. CIV. STAT. arts. 8306-8309 (Vernon, 1956).
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the workman or the insurer to bring suit "to set aside" an award
of the administrative board. 13 However, as the statute is inter-
preted by the Texas courts no judicial action is required for the
setting aside of an award; as soon as suit is filed and the court
acquires jurisdiction the board award is automatically vacated
and no longer in force.14 Since the trial is de novo the real effect
of suit is to allow the entire controversy to be brought before
the court for a full civil trial on the facts as well as the law,15
with the burden of proof as to the right to compensation rest-
ing upon the workman-claimant even when the insurer insti-
tutes the suit.16 Moreover, the claimant, although limited to the
cause of action alleged before the board, may claim and recover
any compensation up to the maximum allowed by law.1 There-
fore, it would appear that when an insurer brings an action "to
set aside" an award of the board his suit, as interpreted by the
Texas courts, is in the nature of a declaratory action; he seeks
a declaration of non-liability as to all claims arising out of the
13. Id. art. 8307, § 5, provides in relevant part: "Any interested party who
is not willing and does not consent to abide by the final ruling and decision of
said Board shall . . . file with said Board notice that he will not abide by said
final ruling and decision. And he shall . . . after giving such notice bring suit
in the county where the injury occurred to set aside said ruling and decision, and
said Board shall proceed no further toward the adjustment of such claim ...
Whenever such suit is brought, the rights and liability of the parties thereto shall
be determined by the provisions of this law . . . and the court shall . . . determine
the issues in such cause, instead of the Board, upon trial de novo, and the burden
or (sic) proof shall be upon the party claiming compensation. . . . In case of
recovery, the same shall not exceed the maximum compensation allowed under
the provisions of this law. If any party to such final ruling and decision of the
Board, after having given notice as above provided, fails . . . to institute and
prosecute a suit to set the same aside, then said final ruling and decision shall be
binding upon all parties thereto."
14. Southern Canal Co. v. State Bd. of Water Eng'rs, 159 Tex. 227, 318
S.W.2d 619 (1958) (dictum) ; Texas Reciprocal Ins. Ass'n v. Leger, 128 Tex.
319, 97 S.W.2d 677 (1936) ; Zurich Gen. Ace. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 128
Tex. 313, 97 S.W.2d 674 (1936) (pointing out that the award was no longer
enforceable by the claimant who had invoked the court's jurisdiction to set aside
the award even though a nonsuit was subsequently taken) ; Southern Cas. Co. v.
Fulkerson, 45 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Comm. App. 1932) ; Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n
v. Nitcholas, 328 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
15. Lone Star Gas Co. v. Texas, 137 Tex. 279, 298, 153 S.W.2d 681, 692
(1941) : "Power to try a case de novo vests a court with full power to determine
the issues and rights of all parties involved, and to try the case as if the suit
had been filed originally in that court." In Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wright, 196
S.W.2d 349, 351 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946), error ref., it is stated: "[W]e have
found no instance in which a final award of the Board or any part of a final
award of the Board was declared to be binding on the court or the parties in the
trial de novo, except in the sense that the entering of a final award by the Board
is a condition prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction by the court."
16. TEXAS ANN. CIV. STAT. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon, 1956) ; Texas Reciprocal
Ins. Ass'n v. Leger, 128 Tex. 319, 97 S.W.2d 677 (1936).
17. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co. v. Choate, 89 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Comm. App.
1936) United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Baker, 65 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App.
1933) ; Texas Indem. Ins. Co. v. Bridges, 52 S.W.2d 1075 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932),
error ref.
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cause of action alleged by the claimant before the board, and he
subjects himself to liability for those claims, which may far
exceed the board award. These interpretations of the statute by
the Texas courts would appear to be binding on the federal
courts under the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins. 8
In order for a federal court to have jurisdiction of a particu-
lar action the value of the matter in controversy must exceed
the statutory minimum.1" In Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v.
Red Cab Co. 20 the Supreme Court said "the rule governing dis-
missal for want of jurisdiction ... is that ... the sum claimed
by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good
faith."' 21 This rule, known as the plaintiff-viewpoint rule,22 is
that generally applied.23 The "good faith" element required in
the assertion of the plaintiff's claim has been interpreted to
mean only legal good faith, as "it must appear to a legal cer-
tainty that the claim is really for less to justify dismissal."
(Emphasis added.) 24 In an action for declaratory relief from the
claims of another, a situation persuasively similar to that in the
instant case, the potential liability from which the plaintiff
seeks relief is determinative of the jurisdictional amount as a
result of the application of the plaintiff-viewpoint rule.25 An-
other outcome of the use of the plaintiff-viewpoint rule is that
a defendant's counterclaim, constituting no part of the plaintiff's
cause of action, should never be allowed to provide the juris-
dictional amount for that action.26 Furthermore, it has been well
18. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See, e.g., the following cases interpreting Erie:
Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939); Klaxon Co. v. Stantor
Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) ; Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99
(1945).
19. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441 (1850). A mere allegation of the jurisdictional
facts by the party attempting to invoke federal jurisdiction will suffice unless his
allegations are questioned by the other party or by the court, in which case the
invoking party must bear the burden of proving the requisite facts. McNutt v.
GMAC, 298 U.S. 178 (1935).
20. 303 U.S. 283 (1938).
21. Id. at 288.
22. Perhaps the foremost proponent of the plaintiff-viewpoint theory, Professor
(later judge) Dobie, states the rule thusly: "The amount in controversy in the
United States District Court is always to be determined by the value to the
plaintiff of the right which he in good faith asserts in his pleading that sets forth
the operative facts which constitute his cause of action." DOBIE, FEDERAL JURIS-
DICTION AND PROCEDURE 133 (1928).
23. 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.91[1] (2d ed. 1960). See Cowen, Federal
Jurisdiction Amended, 44 VA. L. REv. 971, 973 (1958).
24. Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938).
See Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co., 170 U.S. 468 (1898).
25. 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 57.23 (2d ed. 1960) ; 1 ANDERSON, ACTIONS
FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 197 (2d ed. 1951).
26. 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.98 (2d ed. 1960) ;DoRE, FEDERAL JURIS-
DICTION AND PROCEDURE 144 (1928).
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settled that jurisdiction once invoked by the filing of a proper
complaint will not be destroyed by subsequent events which
might have defeated jurisdiction had they occurred before the
filing of the complaint.2 7
Application of the plaintiff-viewpoint rule in the instant
case could have led to opposite results depending upon what the
Court considered to be the true object of the plaintiff's suit.
The Court could have decided that the object sought to be gained
by the plaintiff was freedom from a $1,050 liability, in which
case there would have been no federal jurisdiction.2 8 On the
other hand, it could have said that the object sought by the
action was freedom from a $14,035 claim. The Court adopted
the latter approach, and then applied the plaintiff-viewpoint
test, finding that the plaintiff's allegation that a $14,035 claim
was in controversy satisfied jurisdictional requirements. It was
made clear that the test being applied was a federal test, and
not the state test relied on by the court of appeals.2 9 The Court
also felt that Congress had passed the 1958 amendment prohibit-
ing removal of workmen's compensation actions only after care-
ful study and that a prohibition of original federal court filings
by insurers could not be inferred from the removal prohibition,
regardless of the apparently conflicting policy expression in the
Senate Report. It was then held that a federal court could still
acquire diversity jurisdiction of an original action brought by
a workmen's compensation insurer.
A vigorous dissent80 found cause to disagree with the Court
as to the nature of the plaintiff's action. The essence of the
action was considered by the dissent to be the setting aside of
a $1,050 award.81 The dissent then reasoned that since the value
27. 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.91[3] (2d ed. 1960). Jurisdiction is not
destroyed, e.g., by a subsequent lowering of the plaintiff's claim below the juris-
dictional minimum. Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S.
283 (1938).
28. Such a determination was the basis of the district court's holding. In
National Sur. Corp. v. Chamberlain, .71 F. Supp. 591, 597-98 (N.D. Tex. 1959),
it is said that "the amount in controversy in this suit is the value of the right
of plaintiff ...to be free from the $2,000 liability fastened upon it by the award
of the Industrial Accident Board." See note 4 supra.
29. The Court relied on Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100
(1941), for the proposition that the amount in controversy was to be determined
by federal standards. There it was said: "[T]he removal statute, which is
nationwide in its operation, was intended to -be uniform in its application, unaf-
fected by local law definition or characterization of the subject matter to which
it is to be applied. Hence the Act of Congress must be construed as setting up
its own criteria, irrespective of local law, for determining in what instances suits
are to be removed from the state to the federal courts." Id. at 104.
30. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Clark, Brennan, and Stewart dissent.
31. 367 U.S. 348, 358 (1961) : "At the time respondent filed its complaint,
[Vol. XXII
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of the object of the suit was only $1,050 the Court was predicat-
ing federal jurisdiction upon a predicted counterclaim. 2 Thus,
the dissent inferred that the defendant could have defeated fed-
eral jurisdiction by denying that he would make a claim in excess
of the jurisdictional amount. The minority also adopted the posi-
tion that the 1958 removal prohibition had shown a congressional
intent to limit original filings by insurers, in that otherwise the
workman would not be protected in his right to choose the
forum. Furthermore, it was urged that if the Court was correct
in treating the plaintiff's action as essentially one for declara-
tory relief then use should have been made of the discretionary
refusal of jurisdiction given the federal courts by the Federal
Declaratory Judgments Act.33
Whatever criticism may be made of other portions of the
decision, it appears clear that the Court did not consider itself
to be departing from the plaintiff-viewpoint theory. Once the
Court had made the not unreasonable determination that the
object of the plaintiff's suit was a declaration of non-liability
from a $14,035 claim,3 4 the facts would fit snugly into the plain-
tiff-viewpoint test, establishing jurisdiction.3 5 For this reason it
there was enforceable against it a liability in the amount of $1,050. If petitioner
defaulted, the District Court would set aside the Board award." The same feeling
seems to be the basis of most of the criticism of the Court's decision. See Notes,
11 DE PAUL L. REV. 130 (1961), 36 TUL. L. REV. 148 (1961) (semble). Of.
Professor Moore's discussion of the decision of the court of appeals in 1 MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE .93[5.-3] (2d ed. 1960). It is submitted that the dissent
and others critical of the Court on this basis have not given sufficient weight
to the Texas decisions that the award is vacated by the mere bringing of the
suit and without any action by the Court. See Biokel, The Supreme Court 1960
Term, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 168-70 (1961).
32. 367 U.S. 348, 358 (1961) : "It seems impossible to avoid the conclusion
that the Court is allowing diversity jurisdiction to be predicated upon a counter-
claim which might possibly be filed by petitioner. . . . [I]f the complaint, insuf-
ficient to meet the jurisdictional standards, alleges that a possible compulsory
counterclaim, sufficient to meet such standards, may be filed by the defendant,
federal jurisdiction attaches."
33. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1958). See BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDG-
MENTS 312 (2d ed. 1941).
34. It would appear that the Court's view that the potential liability of the
plaintiff is the amount in controversy was also held by those federal courts which
interpreted the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act before 1958. See General
Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Mostert, 131 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1942).
35. 367 U.S. 348, 353 (1961), where it was said: "No denial of these allega-
tions in the complaint has been made, no attempted disclaimer or surrender of
any part of the original claim has been made . . . . and there has been no other
showing, let alone 'to a legal certainty,' of any lack of good faith on the part of
the respondent in alleging that a $14,035 claim is in controversy." The above
language upon cursory examination might appear to imply that the finding of the
requisite amount in controversy is being based on the fact that the counterclaim
was for the amount of the original claim. However, the Court was showing the
total absence of evidence of lack of good faith on the part of the plaintiff in
alleging the defendant's claim to be $14,035. Resort to facts disclosed at trial in
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would appear that the Court was not concerned with the coun-
terclaim itself as a vehicle of jurisdiction, and that a counter-
claim for less than $10,000 would not have defeated jurisdiction
properly invoked by the filing of a complaint meeting the juris-
dictional requirements. Once it is recognized that the Court con-
sidered the plaintiff's action as involving a $14,035 claim it be-
comes apparent that the instant case serves as an endorsement
of the plaintiff-viewpoint test.
The Court's refusal to infer from the 1958 amendment a con-
gressional intent to prohibit original federal court actions by
workmen's compensation insurers appears correct. Such an in-
tent presumably would have been made manifest had it existed,
and it is noteworthy that Congress had before it statistical data
on original federal court filings by such insurers when it chose
expressly to prohibit only removal of workmen's compensation
actions.8 6 However, to exercise jurisdiction upon a finding that
original diversity jurisdiction is present in such actions, as the
Court did, is to beg the question. The real issue here, left unan-
swered by the Court, is whether there is or may be any basis
for refusing to exercise that jurisdiction which admittedly ex-
ists. Myriad judicial language can be found exhorting the fed-
eral courts to stay strictly within the bounds of federal jurisdic-
tional statutes, but the context of such statements is almost
invariably one in which the courts are being exhorted not to
exrend federal jurisdiction beyond those limits.8 7 On the other
hand, there have been many examples of refusal by the federal
courts to exercise in particular cases that jurisdiction which had
been granted by Congress.38 Furthermore, the simplest and most
testing good faith is sanctioned in Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co.,
303 U.S. 283, 290 (1938) : "In a cause instituted in federal court the plaintiff
chooses the forum. He knows or should know whether his claim is within the
statutory requirement as to amount. His good faith in choosing the federal
forum is open to challenge not only by resort to the face of his complaint, but by
the facts disclosed at the trial, and if from either source it is clear that his claim
never could have amounted to the sum necessary to give jurisdiction there is no
injustice in dismissing the suit."
36. S. Rep. No. 1768, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958) ; S. Rep. No. 1830, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1958).
37. In Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934), the Court says: "Due
regard for the rightful independence of state governments, which should actuate
federal courts, requires that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to
the precise limits which the statute has defined." The important element of the
theory is that if the federal courts go beyond that jurisdiction granted them by
Congress then the courts may well be impinging on rights of the individual states.
See Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943) ; Kline v. Burke Const. Co., 260
U.S. 226 (1922).
38. Leiter Minerals Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957); Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496 (1941) ; Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
[Vol. XXII
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widely accepted method of justifying such refusal, viz., discre-
tionary refusal to grant relief under the Federal Declaratory
Judgments Act 39 where such relief would be improper or against
public policy,40 was suggested by the dissent and went unan-
swered by the Court. !Since the Court clearly considered the
plaintiff's action as declaratory in nature, and since the Court
did recognize that the Senate Report was concerned with the
hardship placed on a workman by a trial in federal court, the
dissent's suggestion was at least germane. As a result of the
Court's apparently unqualified exercise of jurisdiction in this
case, it would seem to be of no importance whether a similar
state court action brought by the workman was in existence
either before or after the bringing of the federal court action by
the insurer. Therefore, the insurer is put to little disadvantage,
if any, by the removal prohibition. In cases in which he might
once have sought removal he may now simply bring a concurrent
federal action and begin a race to judgment.41 The workman is
accordingly under an even greater procedural disadvantage than
he would have been subjected to by mere removal, for he may
now be forced to participate in two separate suits conceivably
carried on in widely separated locales. It is not difficult to
visualize the shrinkage in settlement value of the claim of a
workman faced with such an alternative. In this regard the de-
cision in the instant case appears to have left serious problems
unanswered, with the result that a major policy behind the 1958
removal amendment has been effectively emasculated.
James R. Craig
INSURANCE - INSURABLE INTERESTS
Plaintiff, a finance company employee, allegedly made an
oral promise to her employer in order to induce him to loan
her brother money with which to purchase an automobile. The
promise was to the effect that she would repay the loan if her
brother defaulted. The finance company made the loan, plain-
tiff's brother purchased an automobile, and subsequently the
automobile was destroyed in an accident. Plaintiff brought the
instant action on a policy of collision insurance which named
39. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1958).
40. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 312 (2d ed. 1941).
41. Since both actions would be in personam they would be able to proceed
concurrently under the rule of Kline v. Burke Const. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922).
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